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ABSTRACT
REDD+ is usual ly presented as an incentive-based mechanism
that can provide payments to compensate for the costs induced
by conservation restrictions. Yet in Madagascar REDD+ is imple-
mented through a command-and-control approach with almost
no or insufficient compensation. This paper chal lenges the finan-
cial feasibi l i ty of an individual cash or in-kind compensation
scheme as part of a REDD+ project and assesses the cost of im-
plementing a hypothetical individual compensation scheme for
local populations l iving on the boundary of an ongoing REDD+ pi-
lot project in southeastern Madagascar. In order to estimate a
plausible level of compensation, we measured households’ per-
ceived economic losses arising from the project. We carried out
this economic evaluation based on households’ declarative state-
ments about their agricultural production (before and after project
implementation) and their perceptions of the causes of such
changes. We then estimated the start-up and running costs of im-
plementing conditional transfers to compensate for reported
losses using first-hand project cost data from different conserva-
tion projects in Madagascar, including the one analysed in this pa-
per. Comparing our estimated total cost to the current budget of
the REDD+ project, we concluded that compensating households
would cost seven times more than the budget in itial ly devoted to
field activities during the first phase of the project. Yet we discuss
that individual compensation may increase the long-term environ-
mental and social additional i ty (through greater legitimacy) of the
REDD+ project, as it may play a role of safety nets and help farm-
ers, especial ly the most vulnerable ones, to implement new agri-
cultural techniques to adapt to land use restrictions.
RÉSUMÉ
REDD+ est généralement présenté comme un mécanisme incitatif
basé sur la compensation des coûts induits par les mesures de
conservation de la forêt. Cette vision de REDD+ tend toutefois à
être remise en cause par la réal i té des projets pi lotes. À
Madagascar par exemple, les projets pi lotes sont mis en œuvre
selon une logique contraignante voire coercitive, où les compens-
ations pour les populations locales sont extrêmement réduites.
Partant de l ’hypothèse que l ’un des facteurs expl icatifs de l ’ab-
sence de mécanisme de compensation directe est un coût trop
élevé, ce papier évalue le coût de la mise en œuvre d’un système
de compensations monétaires individuel les en paral lèle des activ-
ités de conservation et de développement d’un projet pi lote
REDD+ situé au sud-est de Madagascar. Pour ce faire, nous esti-
mons les pertes économiques induites par le projet tel les que
perçues par les ménages au moyen d’entretiens individuels. Ces
entretiens nous ont permis de reconstituer la production des
ménages avant et après la mise en œuvre du projet, et d’évaluer
dans quel le mesure les changements opérés étaient ou non dus à
l ’ implémentation du projet REDD+. Dans un second temps, nous
estimons les coûts de transaction l iés à la mise en œuvre du sys-
tème de compensation en uti l isant des données issues de
différents projets de conservation et de développement à Mada-
gascar. La confrontation de nos estimations avec le budget actuel
du projet REDD+ montre que compenser les pertes individuel les
des mé- nages est hors de la portée financière du projet, puisque
cela représente sept fois le budget dédié aux activités de
développement local pendant la première phase du projet. Dans
la discussion, nous revenons sur l ’ intérêt d’associer des com-
pensations individuel les aux programmes d’investissement agri-
cole, dans la mesure où les compensations jouent un rôle de
«  fi let de sécurité  » pour les ménages, notamment les plus vulnér-
ables, et les encouragent à expérimenter de nouvel les techniques
agricoles leur permettant de s’adapter aux restrictions d’usage.
INTRODUCTION
Tropical forests play a major role in cl imate regulation, both for the
regulation of hydrological and carbon cycles (IPCC 2007, Pan et al .
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201 1 ) and as hosts of invaluable biological d iversity (O’Connor
2008). The Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and De-
gradation (REDD+) is an international in itiative which seeks to
channel funds with the support of the UNFCCC (United Nations
Framework Convention on Cl imate Change) negotiations to en-
courage tropical countries to protect their forests. Socio-economic
incentives and performance-based payments are one of the core
principles of REDD+ (Karsenty and Ongolo 201 2), which explains
why the implementation of some REDD+ projects contains pay-
ments for environmental services as a separate but complement-
ary tool (Ezzine-de-Blas et al . 201 5). Madagascar has a record of
implementing REDD+ strategies through command-and-control
approaches using protected areas with almost no or insufficient
compensation (Brimont and Karsenty 201 5). In Madagascar, there
are currently four ongoing REDD+ pi lot projects being implemen-
ted by international environmental NGOs. Al l of them plan to cre-
ate new protected areas, fol lowing the l ine of the pre-REDD+
national conservation strategy; in 2003, the Government of Mada-
gascar decided to more than triple the size of the protected areas
network (Corson 201 1 ), which is planned to cover 40% of the re-
maining natural forest of the island (S. Desbureaux 201 4, pers.
comm.). When protected areas fal l in populated areas within or
along its boundary, the NGOs have traditional ly supported the cre-
ation of management transfer contracts (transferts de gestion)
from the state to the communities. The community—represented
by an ad hoc legal ly recognized local institution cal led VOI (Von-
dron’Olona Ifotony)—is required to respect and enforce a man-
agement plan which defines zones with different degrees of
protection—and therefore land use rights—depending on the
type of land use found at the time of the management transfer.
For example, forests in the buffer area of the protected area are
usual ly classified as strict conservation zones. In the other zones,
further from the edge of the protected area and where forests are
more degraded, harvesting activities for timber and non-timber
products are al lowed through strict regulations enforced by the
VOI and the protected area management organization
(Madagascar National Parks, MNP), which obl ige households to
pay a harvesting fee. Slash-and-burn agriculture, which is the main
component of households’ l ivel ihoods, is only permitted on dedic-
ated fal lows within a VOI ’s territory after the payment of the slash-
and-burn agriculture or tavy fee (Antona et al . 2004, Hockley and
Andriamarovololona 2007). Therefore, the REDD+ project entai ls
strict (for undisturbed forests) or fee-mediated (for degraded
areas) restriction for the use of significant areas that were tradi-
tional ly used for tavy. Such conservation restriction rules are l ikely
to entai l a cost for local communities, since farmers can no longer
clear forest to manage soi l ferti l i ty (Styger et al . 2009).
In addition to management transfers, REDD+ projects can
fund local development projects which are expected to com-
pensate and help households adapt to the losses arising from
conservation restrictions. Recent studies have shown that these
development projects faced the typical d ifficulties of Integrated
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), which are re-
lated to (i ) el i te capture, (i i ) exclusion of the most vulnerable
households, (i i i ) concentration of support on the more accessible
zones, and (iv) inadequacy of the means proposed compared to
the needs (Brimont et al . 201 5). Therefore, households l iving in the
territories affected by REDD+ projects are de facto hardly com-
pensated for the agricultural and l ivel ihood losses resulting from
conservation restrictions.
Some authors argue that individual direct transfers benefit
local populations more than ICDPs (Ferraro and Kiss 2002). Some
one-off cases have been tested in Madagascar with relative suc-
cess (Sommervi l le et al . 201 0). Other academics argue that com-
pensation covering only the cost of losing access to forest land is
not sufficient to decrease deforestation over the long term, mainly
because it does not address the drivers of deforestation. Such
compensation should be l inked to development activities that
support agronomic innovation or the creation of economic altern-
atives (Karsenty 201 1 , Brimont and Karsenty 201 5). Lack of finan-
cial means is a recurring problem for environmental NGOs and
tropical conservation, and the gap between current funding and
Figure 1 . Study area with boundaries of the six participating VOIs.
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budget needs is particularly large in very poor countries l ike Mad-
agascar (Balmford and Whitten 2003). The purpose of this paper is
therefore to discuss whether a direct payment scheme—in cash
or in kind—would be an economical ly and social ly viable option as
part of the ongoing Beampingaratsy REDD+ pi lot project, in south-
eastern Madagascar, by assessing the cost of its implementation.
Although no direct conditional transfers are currently being imple-
mented in our study area, we ask whether the implementation of
an individual compensation scheme in paral lel with existing con-
servation and development activities appears to be an economic-
al ly viable and efficient option.
THE BEAMPINGARATSY FOREST AND THE REDD+ CON-
SERVATION PROJECT. The Beampingaratsy forest covers
38,250 hectares and is located 1 00 ki lometres north of Fort-
Dauphin, the largest town on the southeastern coast of Madagas-
car (Figure 1 ). More than 6500 households, i .e. , about 30,000
people, l ive in this area (WWF 201 1 ). The main driver of deforesta-
tion is tavy and the conversions of forest to pastureland on the
western side of Beampingaratsy forest, whi le forest degradation is
caused by col lecting firewood (Laboratoire de Recherche
Appl iquée and WWF 201 1 ).
The Beampingaratsy project started in 2009 as part of a na-
tionwide REDD+ project cal led the Hol istic Conservation Pro-
gramme for Forests in Madagascar (HCPF), implemented by a
French environmental association, Etc Terra (previously known as
GoodPlanet), in partnership with the World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWF). The project was funded by Air France, a French airl ine
company. During the first implementation phase (2009–201 2), the
purpose of the HCPF REDD+ project was twofold: first, developing
national carbon accounting methodologies to measure the reduc-
tion of emissions from deforestation and, secondly, implementing
conservation activities in five forest areas of Madagascar, includ-
ing Beampingaratsy. The overal l budget of the Beampingaratsy
project was about $US 1 50,000 (HCPF in l i tt. , non-publ ic account-
ing document). Functioning costs (salaries and office cost)
amounted to 35% of the budget, whi le field activities accounted
for 65%. During this first period, the project supported the imple-
mentation of 20 management transfers (VOIs) and initiated the
legal and administrative process to create the protected area.
Whi le in other REDD+ projects VOI territories are mainly located in
the buffer zones of protected areas, in Beampingaratsy the future
protected area was made up of the conservation zones of VOIs
(Figure 2). This was due to both the specific topographical and
demographic conditions of the Beampingaratsy forest, and the so-
cial -ecological purpose of the protected area: Beampingaratsy
was intended to be an IUCN category V protected landscape
(IUCN 201 6) where the interaction of people and nature is recog-
nized and to be safeguarded. At the end of the first implementa-
tion phase, the project in the created VOIs fostered a variety of
development and conservation activities, which consisted of a re-
forestation programme, support for improving agricultural yield,
such as train ing in improved rice growing techniques, and activit-
ies aimed at diversifying household incomes, i .e. , beekeeping,
cash crops, tree nurseries or market gardening. The project also
funded a l i teracy programme for adults, which was implemented
in some VOIs. The second implementation phase (201 3–201 7) is
pursuing those development and conservation activities.
During the first implementation phase, the deforestation rate
decreased from an average of 1 .44% per tavy season before the
project began (2000–2008), to 0.81 % per tavy season (C. Grinand
201 3, pers. comm.). To provide a basel ine for comparison, the de-
forestation rate at national level between 2000 and 201 0 was
0.97% (Mayaux et al . 201 3).
PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (PES). The
payments for environmental services (PES) l i terature usual ly
distinguishes between three types of costs: (i ) opportunity costs,
i .e. , households’ forgone revenues from the protection of ecosys-
tems, (i i ) transaction costs, which cover the start-up and running
costs incurred by the implementation and functioning of PES, and
(i i i ) the actual payments (Pirard 201 2, Ezzine-de-Blas et al . 201 6).
Many studies have evaluated the opportunity costs of reducing
deforestation (for Madagascar case studies, see Kramer et al .
1 995, Shyamsundar and Kramer 1 996, Kremen et al . 2000, Ferraro
2002), and the transaction costs of direct incentive schemes in
tropical countries (Angelsen 2008, Börner and Wunder 2008,
Grieg-Gran 2008, Wunder et al . 2008).
METHODS
In this article, we differentiate costs according to their economic
(opportunity vs. transaction costs), and time-dependent (start-up
vs. running costs) rationales. We identify three categories of costs:
compensation costs, implementation costs, and operating and
monitoring costs.
Compensation costs: Compensation costs are the losses ex-
perienced by local populations resulting from conservation re-
strictions. As previously explained, in Madagascar conservation
restrictions usual ly entai l a decrease in agricultural production be-
cause farmers can no longer clear primary forest to manage soi l
ferti l i ty. Previous research in Madagascar studying the costs of
conservation for local populations has not assessed the impacts
on l ivel ihoods; i t has used either a contingent valuation approach,
such as the “wi l l ingness-to-accept” methodology (Kramer et al .
1 995, Shyamsundar and Kramer 1 996, Desbureaux and Brimont
201 5), or the opportunity costs method, in which the authors as-
sess the potential income derived from practising agriculture on
newly deforested land (Kremen et al . 2000, Ferraro 2002). For the
purpose of this article, we chose to estimate the loss of house-
hold income arising from the implementation of the
Beampingaratsy REDD+ project, i .e. , restrictions on the use of nat-
ural resources establ ished by VOI management plans, as a way of
estimating the de facto real conservation cost for local popula-
tions. In order to estimate these costs, we conducted two series
of semi-structured interviews with the heads of household loc-
ated in the VOIs on the eastern side of the Beampingaratsy forest
at the end of 201 1 and mid-201 2. This research covered six out of
1 2 VOIs, representing 32,51 6 hectares of forest (Figure 2). In al l ,
1 00 households were interviewed. Because of the lack of any
population census, we selected the householders who were at
home when we visited the VOIs and who were wi l l ing to respondFigure 2. Zoning scheme of the Beampingaratsy REDD+ project.
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to our questions. To minimize sampl ing bias due to this constraint,
we visited 1 2 hamlets located in the buffer zone of the protected
forest. The VOIs had been informed of our arrival prior to a meet-
ing with local authorities on the weekly market day.
We used two proxies to measure the impact of the project on
l ivel ihoods: The change in the reported time al located to the dif-
ferent agricultural activities of the household, and the change in
the reported production associated with each of the agricultural
activities. Changes in time were measured using the pebble distri-
bution method developed by Colfer, Shei l and coworkers (Colfer
et al . 1 999, Shei l et al . 2001 , Shei l et al . 2003). The pebble distribu-
tion method is a scoring procedure based on pictures which sym-
bol ize the outcomes to be scored: the counters should be
attributed to outcomes according to their quantitative relation-
ships or values. The participants are then asked to explain the final
scores (Lynam et al . 2007). The pebble distribution method is ap-
propriate in very poor areas where people are often i l l i terate. Pic-
tures and physical counters help them to represent trends and
serve as a basis for the discussion. As agricultural activities are
l ikely to be impacted by conservation restrictions, we identified
the different crops grown by farmers with the help of the project
staff. We drew cards to represent each crop using two colours,
one representing crops grown inside the forest, and the other
crops grown outside the forest.
Tubers (cassava, yams, sweet potatoes) and rainfed rice were
found to be the main crops in forest; fruits (banana, pineapple),
coffee, tobacco and sugarcane were also grown in fields mixed
with forest regeneration. In non-forest areas, irrigated rice was the
main crop, with cassava and other semi-perennial tubers. There
were also perennial crops such as fruit trees (l i tchi , mango or or-
ange trees) mainly used for home consumption, and cash crop
trees (coffee).
The interviews proceeded in two steps. First, participants
were asked to distribute counters according to the time they had
al located to different crops before the project started, i .e. in 2008.
We converted counters into an actual share of time by divid ing
the number of counters al located to each crop by the total num-
ber of counters used (participants were free to choose the global
quantity of counters they wanted to). Secondly, we asked for the
quantity of production associated with each crop. For this step the
counters were used as a basis for discussing agricultural produc-
tion. We converted agricultural production into monetary equival-
ent using local market prices to calculate the income derived from
each crop. We classed incomes in five groups: (i ) perennial crops
grown in the forest, (i i ) annual crops grown in the forest, (i i i ) per-
ennial crops grown outside the forest, (iv) annual crops grown
outside the forest, and (v) off-farm activities.
We repeated the same procedure for 201 1 . I f changes had
taken place between 2008 and 201 1 , we investigated causal rela-
tionships through semi-structured discussions with the parti-
cipants to capture the net effect of the implementation of the
protected area. We val idated our identification of the households
who had been affected by the implementation of the protected
area with a census carried out by the team of the project that had
identified the households most rel iant on forest land. To estimate
the net cost borne by the households affected by the project, we
compared the stated changes in agricultural production between
2008 and 201 1 for the two groups of households. Changes in pro-
duction were calculated by subtracting production in 2008, i .e. ,
before the implementation of the project, from production in 201 1
for each household, i .e. , after the implementation of the project
(Figure 3). A positive income meant that production increased
from 2008 to 201 1 , whi le a negative income meant production de-
creased from 2008 to 201 1 . In addition to crop cards, we added a
card representing off-farm activities (smal l -scale mining, self-re-
tai l ing, bui ld ing work, basketry) and agricultural employment to
measure the changes in time and income associated with off-
farm activities. We also col lected data on the main characteristics
of the households we interviewed (e.g. , fami ly composition, age
and level of education and origin of the head of fami ly). Paramet-
ric statistics (Student’s t-test) were performed with R software.
Operating and monitoring costs: Operating and monitoring
costs were running transaction costs. We assumed that the direct
payment scheme would be implemented in paral lel with existing
conservation and development activities whi le human resources
remained constant. Our estimations referred to the costs incurred
by implementing the individual compensation scheme only. Oper-
ating costs covered management costs which are administrative
costs including the transportation and distribution of the com-
pensation. As there are no bank services around the
Beampingaratsy forests, we further assumed that the person in
charge of the VOIs would go to the nearest town, Fort Dauphin,
obtain the money, and then distribute it to the beneficiaries (one
distribution event per year). Operating costs included (i ) the com-
mission of the bank in charge of the money deposit, and (i i ) the
transport, accommodation and expenses of people in charge of
money withdrawal and distribution. The bank commission was es-
timated based on a former programme of direct payments to VOIs
implemented by Conservation International (CI ) in Didy, a rural
town on the edge of the CAZ protected area (Ankeniheny-Za-
hamena Corridor). In this programme, the money was managed by
a micro-credit institution which took a 2.5% commission. The
other operating costs as wel l as monitoring costs were estimated
using data from the accounting documents of the Beampingaratsy
project at WWF regional office in Fort Dauphin. Monitoring would
be undertaken on a yearly basis by the NGO in charge of project
implementation to confirm that the compensation was distributed
to each beneficiary, and col lect forest and socio-economic data to
assess changes.
Implementation costs: Implementation costs were one-off
transaction costs which occurred before the start of the pay-
ments. They were composed of two activities: the identification of
beneficiaries and the information and awareness campaign. The
identification of beneficiaries, i .e. , the households who were af-
fected by the conservation project, would be done by Malagasy
Figure 3. Changes in production value before and after implementation of the
project in the affected and unaffected households (N=1 00, error bars indicate
standard errors).
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consultants l iving in the Fort Dauphin area (meaning low trans-
portation costs). We estimated these costs based on the account-
ing documents of the Beampingaratsy project. After identifying
the beneficiaries, the implementer staff would explain the pur-
pose of the compensation programme and present the criteria
used to select the beneficiaries of the compensation. Beneficiary
identification cards—which helped to identify beneficiaries as
identity cards are uncommon in that place—were distributed to
each individual beneficiary to inform him/her of his/her right to
receive the compensation.
RESULTS
COSTS FOR LOCAL HOUSEHOLDS. Considering both changes
in time al location and in incomes, our results showed that 38
out of a total of 1 00 heads of household had not perceived any
change in their activities, 47 stated a negative impact in their
activities due to the implementation of the protected area, and 1 1
stated changes due to causes other than the implementation of
the protected area, such as cl imate events, health problems, in-
sect pests, etc. Lastly, four households reported positive changes
due to the implementation of the conservation project. These
farmers grew irrigated rice in the bottomlands, and they said that
forest conservation had increased the water supply for their fields
and improved their yields. These statements should be treated
with caution, as a positive impact due to a reduction in deforesta-
tion on the water supply is yet to be confirmed and would, i f such
a causal relationship were to be confirmed, require time to hap-
pen (R. Vaudry 201 4, pers. comm.). Instead, these perceptions can
be interpreted as echoing the NGO’s environmental discourse
about the l ink between water and forests. The 47 households who
considered the changes in their activities due to the conservation
project to be negative, henceforth referred to as the ‘affected
households’ as opposed to the other 53 households, cal led ‘unaf-
fected households’, mentioned decreasing yields as the main
reason, since they were not al lowed to clear undisturbed forest to
access new ferti le land for tavy activities. In order to adapt to this
constraint, these farmers had to clear former fal low areas where
ferti l i ty had been already exhausted. As a result, farmers chose to
stop growing some of the crops usual ly grown in the
forest—mainly rice—either because yield was too low, or because
they preferred to set aside the land outside the forest in order to
al low soi l ferti l i ty to recover. Dependence on forests for this group
of households appeared to be substantial (Figure 4) compared to
unaffected households (Figure 5). These results showed that land
use restrictions affected in particular the households who rel ied
most on slash-and-burn agriculture.
We observed a significant decrease in the production of an-
nual crops farmed on forest land by both affected and unaffected
households. The average income from crops grown on forest land
by affected households dropped from $US 238/yr to $US 64/yr (t-
test, p=0.0001 ) and by unaffected households from $US 1 03/yr to
$US 36/yr (t-test, p=0.04). This means that factors other than the
conservation project impacted agricultural production homogen-
eously for both unaffected and affected households. According to
our respondents, these factors were cl imate events, health prob-
lems of the head of household and insect pests. Conservation re-
strictions exacerbated such drops, since the decrease in
agricultural production of the affected households was statistic-
al ly greater than that of the unaffected households. The decrease
in time al location for annual forest crops fel l from 20% to 1 5% for
the affected households (t-test, p=0.05); th is was not the case for
unaffected households (t-test, p =0.21 ). The time devoted by af-
fected households to annual non-forest crops, i .e. , i rrigated rice,
increased from 1 2% to 1 7% (t-test, p=0.02), whereas it remained
stable for the unaffected households (24% before the project and
23% after).
The difference between the affected and unaffected groups
was only statistical ly significant for the annual crops in the forest.
Affected households lost an average of $US 1 78/yr whi le unaf-
fected households lost $US 71 /yr (t-test, p=0.02); net losses due to
the implementation of the conservation project were $US 1 07/yr
per affected household. This loss amounted to around 1 1 % of the
average monetary equivalent of the total agricultural production
per household.
DIRECT COMPENSATION SCHEME. In order to extrapolate
such a figure to the overal l east-side project implementation
zone, we estimated 55% of households whose agricultural pro-
duction had been affected by the project (55% is the average of
our own estimation and the estimation of the census made by the
project team to identify the households most rel iant on forest land
as previously mentioned). Thus, out of a total of 4400 households
on the eastern side of Beampingaratsy some 2420 households
were assumed to have been affected by the project. The overal l
economic agricultural cost experienced by forest populations on
the eastern side of Beampingaratsy thus amounted to
$US  258,940 per year.
Implementation costs included (i ) the identification of benefi-
ciaries among some 4400 households, and (i i ) the information and
Figure 4. Perceived changes in agricultural production value (bars) and in share of
time for different farming activities for affected households (N=47, error bars
indicate standard errors).
Figure 5. Perceived changes in agricultural production value (bars) and in share of
time for households having stated no impact (N=53, error bars indicate standard
errors).
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awareness campaign to inform beneficiaries of their right to re-
ceive the compensation. Identification of the beneficiaries would
require a field survey. Assuming that a survey carried out 4 inter-
views per day, the survey needed 1 1 00 man-days paid at $US 30
per day (80,000 ariary). We added $US 3000 for transport (from
Fort Dauphin) and equipment (camping gear, paper forms, etc. ),
and we calculated that the total cost of the field survey would
amount to $US 39,000 (including $US 3,000 for the design of the
survey and the database).
We budgeted $US 7750 for data processing, i .e. , computeriz-
ation (220 man-days paid at $US 30) and the analysis of the data-
base to draw up a l ist of selected beneficiaries (30 man-days paid
at $US 30). We budgeted $US 2000 for the creation of beneficiary
cards, and $US 2500 to organize a session to report back the res-
ults to local authorities, the people in charge of the VOIs, and the
local population.
Operating costs covered compensation money management
and annual withdrawal : We assumed that the bank commission
would be 2.5% of the total deposit ($US 258,940), i .e. , $US 6475.
Regarding the cost of the withdrawal of money by the people in
charge of the VOIs, we budgeted $US 80 per VOI per year for
transport, accommodation and per diem i .e. , $US 960 per year for
al l the VOIs. Monitoring costs covered the annual field survey
made by the implementer staff to check that compensation had
been distributed to each beneficiary, and col lect forest and socio-
economic data to assess changes. The cost of the annual field
survey was the same as the initial field survey, which explains why
the operating and monitoring costs were very simi lar to the imple-
mentation costs.
The estimated total cost of implementing direct compensa-
tion scheme to the households affected by the implementation of
the project was $US 361 ,375 for the first year, and $US 31 0,1 25 in
subsequent years. Related to the size of forest in VOIs located on
the eastern side of the Beampingaratsy forest (32,51 6 hectares),
the cost was around $US 1 1 per hectare the first year, and around
$US 1 0 per hectare per year the subsequent years. Related to the
number of households in these VOIs (4400 households), the cost
was around $US 82 per household the first year, and $US 70 per
household per year the subsequent years. I f we added to our es-
timation the current operating budget of the project ($US 1 50,000
during the first implementation phase, i .e. , $US 50,000 per year),
the overal l cost amounted to $US 41 1 ,375 the first year, and $US
360,1 25 in subsequent years (Tables 2 and 3). Related to the size
of the forest in the study zone (32,51 6 hectares), the cost was
around $US 1 3 per hectare the first year, and around $US 1 1 per
hectare per year the subsequent years. Related to the number of
households l iving in this area (4400 households), the cost was
around $US 93 per household the first year, and $US 82 per
household for the subsequent years.
DISCUSSION
This paper estimated the overal l cost of implementing an indi-
vidual compensation scheme as part of a REDD+ project in Mada-
gascar. Assessing the impact of conservation restrictions on forest
land use on local l ivel ihoods, we found that about half of the 4400
households in the study area were affected by the project. The av-
erage loss was $US 1 07 per household per year, which amounted
to about 1 1 % of the average monetary equivalent of the total agri-
cultural production per household. Our results showed that the
time devoted by affected households to irrigated rice increased
from 1 2% to 1 7%: the conservation project probably incited the
affected households to real locate their time from slash-and-burn
agriculture to the cultivation of irrigated rice. However, we did not
detect a statistical ly significant simultaneous increase in produc-
tion for any of the two groups. This result might respond to two
(non-exclusive) factors; first, the increase in labour input was too
Categories of costs
Compensation costs
Implementation costs (only the first year)
Functioning and monitoring costs
Total for the first year
Total for subsequent years
(without implementation costs)
Details
$US1 07 per household (2,420 households)
Methodology and database design
Field survey
Survey analysis
Beneficiaries' identification cards
Reporting and distribution of beneficiaries' cards
Sub-total
Bank fees (in Fort Dauphin)
Cash withdrawal
Field survey
Survey analysis
Sub-total
Detailed budget [in $US]
258,940
3000
36,000
7750
2000
2500
6475
960
36,000
7750
Aggregate budget [in $US]
258,940
51 ,250
51 ,1 85
361 ,375
31 0,1 25
Table 1 . Yearly costs of implementing a direct compensation scheme.
Direct payments scheme Opportunity costs
Transaction costs (first year)
Transaction costs (subsequent years)
Subtotal (first year)
Subtotal (subsequent years)
Current operating budget Investment costs
Transaction costs
Subtotal
Total (first year)
Total (subsequent year)
Total per year [$US]
258,940
1 02,435
51 ,1 85
361 ,375
31 0,1 25
32,500
1 7,500
50,000
41 1 ,375
360,1 25
Per hectare per year [$US]
8
3
2
1 1
1 0
1
1
2
1 3
1 1
Per household per year [$US]
59
23
1 2
82
70
7
4
1 1
93
82
Table 2. Summary of the cost estimates.
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smal l to be translated into higher production, particularly given
that in itiating irrigated agriculture requires a significant amount of
work to bui ld terraces and level the land—it then gradual ly re-
quires less work and yields higher production—and second, in-
puts other than labour were required to improve agricultural yield,
including soi l ferti l i ty and agricultural techniques.
We then estimated the transaction costs of implementing a
direct compensation scheme, and we obtained an overal l cost of
$US 361 ,375 for the first year and $US 31 0,1 25 in subsequent
years because of start-up costs. Transaction costs accounted for a
substantial share of the cost of implementing a PES scheme, a
finding that was in l ine with what some other authors have high-
l ighted (e.g. , Norgaard 201 0, Pirard 201 2). Our study showed that
transaction costs made up 29% of the overal l costs the first year
and 1 9% the subsequent years. The cost of compensating affected
households was high compared to the current funding levels of
the REDD+ project. The current budget devoted to field activities
(e.g. , community-based natural resource management, develop-
ment activities, tree planting) in the eastern part of Beampingar-
atsy was about $US 50,000 in the last budgeted year of the
project, which is more than seven times less than the budget re-
quired for implementing the compensation scheme. This article
therefore confirms that compensating local populations entai ls
significant costs, especial ly when poor populations (i .e. , with a low
opportunity cost) are concerned.
Funding tropical conservation has been difficult for many
years, and the current financial crisis in industrial ized countries
has worsened it. The possibi l i ty of funding from the carbon volun-
tary market and the REDD+ mechanism was tangible at the time
the project was conceived and its implementation started, but
currently the voluntary carbon market is saturated, many projects
are unable to sel l their carbon credits, and REDD+ projects on a
local scale are no longer supported by institutional donors such as
the World Bank, which supports ‘jurisdictional ’ programmes on a
much larger scale (Seyl ler et al 201 6). Balmford and Whitten (2003)
concluded that the lack of funding was mainly due to pol i tical in-
terests. This sti l l holds true when we consider the amounts of
money spent on REDD+ readiness programmes (expertise, work-
shops, negotiations, etc. ) and the tiny share that actual ly goes to
local populations (Bidaud 201 2). Regarding the REDD+ national
strategy, the budget estimated for Madagascar was $US 7.378 mi l-
l ion, of which 65% was for scientific activities, such as carbon
stock measurement (FCPF 201 3). I t is to be hoped that the finan-
cial commitments made by developed countries at the last Con-
ference of the Parties (COP21 ) in Paris for mitigation and
adaptation to cl imate change—$US 1 00 bi l l ion are expected for
developing countries by 2020 to implement action for mitigation
and adaptation to cl imate change—wil l breathe new l ife into the
funding of conservation and development field activities.
Aside from the financial constraints, other factors may ex-
plain why some conservation NGOs and the Government of
Madagascar do not implement direct compensation. First, legal
arguments can be mentioned, as farmers have long been com-
pel led by law to stop slash-and-burn agriculture in primary forest.
During a research meeting at the University of Antananarivo in
201 2, an NGO representative repl ied to criticisms about the ab-
sence of compensation for the costs borne by local peasants say-
ing that NGOs and the State are not obl iged to pay compensation
for stopping primary forest clearance as it is in any case against
the law. This means the customary rights of local populations on
natural resources are not actual ly recognized in spite of the man-
agement transfers. Second, we cannot exclude the possibi l i ty that
compensating households can create perverse effects, especial ly
by attracting new migrants from neighbouring areas (even though
the control of new migration can be part of the PES contracts pro-
posed to communities). Other consequences may be related to
the nature of the compensation. Compensating with cash can en-
tai l a loss of intrinsic motivation, rendering future conservation ac-
tions more expensive and difficult to fit in with the local
population. Al igning in-kind compensation with local motivation
might be a strategy for minimizing such risks (Rode et al . , 201 5).
Third, in a context of l imited financial means and uncertainty
about the future of carbon funding, conservation NGOs may
prefer to concentrate their money on development activities
rather than combining them with direct compensation, in the
hope that benefits from investments in rural development would
continue even after the project ends.
Our study showed that the perceived changes in l ivel ihoods
from conservation restrictions pointed in the direction of a major
disruption to the local populations’ agricultural subsistence prac-
tices. Aware of such a situation, and after numerous exchanges
with the authors of this study, Etc Terra decided to increase the
project’s investment in agricultural innovation to improve irrigated
rice yields through better growing techniques, slash-and-burn fer-
ti l i ty improvement through agro-ecological techniques, and sup-
port for the development of cash crops (Etc Terra 201 5). Such a
turn in the REDD+ project implementation strategy is in l ine with
the numerous informal discussions we had with local farmers on
their need for agricultural support, in particular for the construc-
tion and maintenance of water infrastructure for irrigated rice. By
implementing individual compensation unti l the new agricultural
systems become operational and in paral lel with agricultural in-
vestments, affected households would more l ikely experiment
with innovative techniques and increase the project take-up and
overal l legitimacy. Individual compensation would thus be part of
a mix of conservation and development instruments including
protected areas, management transfers and agricultural invest-
ments. They may play the role of safety nets and help farmers, es-
pecial ly the most vulnerable ones, to test innovative agricultural
techniques.
In this paper we adapted the pebbles distribution method to
capture households’ declarative statements about the changes in
their agricultural production before and after the project. This
method was based on reconstructed and stated data, and was
therefore sensitive to the interviewee’s subjectivity. Nevertheless,
the pebble distribution method has proved rel iable in numerous
research activities to capture consistent data trends (Colfer et al .
1 999, Shei l et al . 2001 , Shei l et al . 2003). A systematic flaw in the
reported perceptions would have prevented our analysis from
capturing statistical ly significant differences between affected and
unaffected households. In addition, we confirmed our categoriza-
tion between affected and unaffected households by double-
checking with the WWF local team household field census. Lastly,
our estimated economic compensation provided the most up-to-
date figures when compared to avai lable studies: Shyamsundar
and Kramer (1 996) found that households would accept 1 85 ki lo-
grams of rice per year to stop using forest located within the con-
servation zone of the Mantadia protected area, whi le in our case
study, $US 1 07 amounted to 284 kg of rice, and Ferraro (2002) es-
timated that stopping deforestation costs would range from $US
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59 to 21 6 per household and per year in the Ranomafana corridor
(we updated Ferraro’s estimate taking into account the inflation
rate since 2002 (INSTAT 201 5)).
Individual compensation would be part of a mix of conserva-
tion and development instruments to increase both the long-term
environmental and social efficacy of the REDD+ projects in Mada-
gascar. They could also increase the legitimacy of the projects, on
local , national , and even international scales. Much criticism has
surfaced in Madagascar and abroad since the Government de-
cision to increase the size of the protected area network: conser-
vation NGOs are blamed for “economical ly displacing” some of
the poorest people on the planet. The Madagascar Environmental
Justice Network is representative of this movement which brings
together scholars, activists and professionals to denounce the so-
cial impacts of the natural resources pol icy in Madagascar1 . By
adequately compensating the local population, individual com-
pensation may faci l i tate the pol i tical acceptance of conservation
pol icies.
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